Election 2024, Social Capital, and Political Culture Theories
The Trump 2024 victory can be examined through the lenses of Robert Putnam’s social capital theory and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s political culture theory. These works established the foundations for studying political culture and civic participation in Europe (examples regarding Italy) and America, influencing generations of political scientists. Almond and Verba’s survey research revolutionized this particular field of study. The results of the night of the election made grad school come alive for many political scientists.
The two frameworks mentioned here provide insight into the social dynamics, cultural shifts, and political engagement patterns that helped shape a historical outcome. I refer to this election as a Trump victory, not necessarily a party victory, and briefly mention the reason(s) below. By examining the presidential candidates’ appeals, supporters’ engagement, and the broader societal polarization through these theories, we can better understand how shifts in civic engagement, social trust, and political culture influence electoral success.
Putnam defines social capital as the networks, norms, and trust facilitating cooperation among people to achieve common goals (1995; 2000). He distinguishes between bonding social capital—strong ties within homogenous groups—and bridging social capital—connections between diverse groups. According to Putnam, social capital has declined in the United States, especially bridging social capital, which is essential for democratic health. This decline is evident with the rise of technology, which has led to less civic participation, weakened community bonds, and diminished trust in institutions, creating a political environment ripe for division (ibid).
Almond and Verba (1963; 1965, 1995) define civic culture as a balanced mix of political orientations, combining participant, subject, and parochial attitudes, with participant attitudes being predominant. It is characterized by active citizen participation in politics and voluntary associations, trust in government institutions, and high political awareness and civic engagement. This culture balances popular control and effective governance, where citizens are active enough to express preferences and accept governmental decisions. According to Almond and Verba, civic culture promotes social cohesion and political stability and is most conducive to maintaining a stable democratic system. Almond and Verba argue that a stable democracy requires a “civic culture” – a balanced mix of participant, subject, and parochial orientations where citizens are sufficiently active to express preferences and accept governmental decisions, thus resolving the tension between popular control and effective governance.
Social Capital Theory and Candidate Appeal
Both Harris and Trump’s political base highlight bonding social capital, as per Putnam. Supporters from both these groups often form an in-group unified by shared values, racial or cultural identities, and economic grievances (discussed in depth below). This in-group cohesion reinforced support and energized the base of each of the candidates. While the Harris campaign had the backing of celebrities and other career politicians, Trump ran as a lone wolf without any former Republican president’s endorsement. This election was based on candidate appeal (both incurred strong likes and dislikes). However, while effective rallying of the base did occur, bonding capital can be isolating, as it emphasizes solidarity within the group while alienating others outside it. This was precisely the case in the 2024 election. The hostile rhetoric and mud-slinging created the worst form of polarization that might have strengthened the base, but the results showed another factor (s) at work.
Putnam’s theory points to the erosion of bridging social capital, which reduces opportunities for dialogue and understanding between the two sides. He states people are less likely to encounter differing viewpoints in a polarized environment. Instead, they are reinforced in their beliefs through echo chambers—evident by social media campaigns and even public meltdowns. This polarization phenomenon aligns with both the party’s divisive messaging and framing of their campaign as a defense against an “enemy.”
Putnam also highlights a decline in institutional trust, a hallmark of decreased social capital (2000). The phenomenon of distrust in institutions and questionable decision-making (primarily funding the war in Ukraine while failing to address inflation and the economy at home; advancing gender agenda that did not seem to be favored by most Americans), ignored by the Biden-Harris administration, has translated into Trump’s victory. Many Trump supporters and voters are disillusioned with traditional institutions—government, media, and academia—that they perceive as out of touch or unresponsive to their needs. The political pundits failed to assess the strong trust in institutions and therefore could not accurately predict Trump winning both the popular and electoral votes. Trump seemed more in tune with people’s concerns and took the opportunity to present himself as an outsider (as he did in the prior election) who understood the continuous frustrations and would tackle the issues they felt were being ignored. His anti-establishment message resonated loudly with those who felt excluded or disconnected from mainstream politics, strengthening his support and boosting his chances. Again, no former Republican president stood by his side to woo voters, and it seemed the public did not seem to care for celebrity or political endorsements either way.
Political Culture Theory and Voter Engagement
Almond and Verba’s theory of political culture complements Putnam’s work by categorizing citizens into three types of political culture: parochial, subject, and participant (1963). These types describe political awareness, engagement, and empowerment levels and provide a framework for understanding how citizens interact with political processes and institutions.
Parochial and Subject Cultures Among Disengaged Voters
According to the authors, Parochial culture includes those disconnected from politics, often due to lack of access or knowledge, while subject culture describes those aware of politics but passive (1963). Almond and Verba’s parochial and subject cultures capture the attitudes of many Trump supporters who felt ignored by mainstream politics and often outright vilified as racists and Nazis. Trump’s anti-establishment message appealed to those groups looking for a significant overhaul. On the other hand, Harris seems to have lost specific demographics of voters by seeming to have nothing new on the agenda and also going “more left than left” on many issues.
Shift to Participant Culture
Trump’s appeal lied in motivating previously disengaged voters to participate actively. On the other hand, Harris’s campaign made projections that did not deliver at the polling booth. Almond and Verba stress that a healthy democracy relies on engaged citizens. Trump’s “forgotten Americans” rhetoric inspired many to vote and advocate, bringing back a sense of belonging for his supporters and garnering additional new supporters.
Polarization and Decline of Bridging Cultures
Almond and Verba argue for a balanced political culture where citizens respect and cooperate across differences (1963). However, both parties’ divisive language has fueled isolated participant cultures, with each side strengthening its in-group identity while becoming more polarized, leading to a fragmented society. However, from Putnam’s perspective, Trump’s in-group has been larger, as seen by the final results of the election.
Reinforcement of Bonding Social Capital: The strong in-group cohesion among Trump’s supporters reflects Almond and Verba’s ideas about group solidarity and social identity within a participant culture. Trump’s supporters have become deeply engaged in political life, forming a cohesive participant culture centered on their shared values and opposition to mainstream institutions. Even as Vice President, Harris has been polled as one of the least liked and not-so-genuine politicians, which has hurt her at the polls. This bonding phenomenon in the Trump base played a pivotal role in elections, as engaged and loyal supporters bothered to organize and vote.
“It’s the Economy, Stupid.”
Though the two frameworks discussed here do not specifically focus on the state of the economy as a bridging or bonding factor, the 2024 U.S. presidential election saw Trump defeat the Vice President, with economic concerns playing a pivotal role (Smith & Johnson, 2024). Voters’ perceptions of the economy and inflation significantly influenced their preferred party. A CNN exit poll showed that about 72% of the public was angered and dissatisfied with the state of affairs, and 72% of voters expressed negative feelings about the country’s current state. Specifically, 43% reported feeling “dissatisfied,” and 29% said they were “angry” about how things are going in the United States. Only 26% had positive sentiments, with 19% feeling “satisfied” and 7% “enthusiastic” (Agiesta, 2024).
A notable disconnect existed between economic data and voter sentiment, with two-thirds of voters viewing the economy negatively (Brown et al., 2024). Inflation emerged as a critical [if not primary] factor, with consumer prices increasing by over 20% since 2021 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2024). The economy ranked as the top issue for voters, with 52% considering it “extremely important” (Gallup, 2024). Trump, a career businessman, successfully capitalized on the state of the economy, with voters viewing him as a better choice to handle the economy than Harris (Pew Research Center, 2024).
The Harris campaign struggled to communicate its economic message effectively, failing to convince voters of the economy’s strength despite positive indicators (Davis, 2024). In short, the election results demonstrate the critical importance of economic perceptions in shaping voter behavior, highlighting the challenges incumbent parties face when voters feel economically strained (Anderson & Lee, 2024).
There are other polarizing factors and limitations of these theoretical frameworks, which I will probably address in another/longer piece. However, the economy has created an in-group that is different from the traditional in-group bonding as proposed by Putnam. Also, social media has played a significant role in creating this new type of in-group, eventually translating into greater exposure and understanding of political platforms, translating the same at the polling booths.
Together, Putnam, Almond, and Verba’s theories explain how Trump’s 2024 victory emerged from broader societal trends, with a particular focus on the economy. In fact, real and perceived dire economic conditions, immigration issues, war(s), and natural disasters around the nation also seemed to have people rallying around the flag and voting Republican.
Conclusion
The outcome of the 2024 election, with Trump’s victory, can be better understood by examining the dynamics of social capital and political culture through the frameworks provided by Robert Putnam, Gabriel Almond, and Sidney Verba. Putnam’s theory of social capital explains how weakened bridging social capital and institutional distrust have fueled polarization, creating an environment where a candidate with a strong anti-establishment appeal could resonate deeply with many voters. Meanwhile, Almond and Verba’s categorization of political cultures helps to explain how Trump’s campaign message activated previously disengaged and dissatisfied voters, turning parochial and subject citizens into active participants through promises of policy overhaul.
These theories show that Trump’s success reflects changes in how people engage politically and stronger in-group bonds within political factions. Economic frustrations and a sense of disconnection from major institutions only added to this existing divide. As the 2024 election demonstrates, candidates who can tap into these dynamics by addressing core economic and social issues may drastically influence political participation and voter alignment, reshaping American politics and setting new precedents.
References
Agiesta, J. (2024, October 25). CNN Poll: Harris and Trump remain in a locked race and are tied among likely voters. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/25/politics/cnn-poll-harris-trump/index.html
Anderson, K., & Lee, S. (2024). Economic perceptions and voting behavior in the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Journal of Political Economy, 132(4), 567-589.
Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Pew Research Center. (2024). Voter attitudes and perceptions in the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/11/voter-attitudes-2024-election
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Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. New York: Harper & Row.
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Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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